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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
I. OVERVIEW 
Angel Pabon appeals the District Court‟s dismissal of 
his pro se petition for habeas corpus as untimely.  He is 
serving consecutive life sentences for two related murder 
convictions in Pennsylvania state court.  He concedes that his 
federal habeas petition was not timely under the one-year 
statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but 
contends that equitable tolling should be granted.  
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Specifically, Pabon maintains that his inability to speak, read, 
or write English, coupled with the prison‟s lack of Spanish-
language legal materials and repeated denials of translation 
assistance, are extraordinary circumstances that prevented 
him from timely filing his habeas petition despite diligent 
efforts to pursue his federal claims.   
The District Court dismissed Pabon‟s habeas petition 
as untimely and denied equitable tolling.  We granted a 
certificate of appealability (“COA”) on that issue.  We 
subsequently issued an order staying oral argument due to a 
potential defect in our COA, as it had not addressed whether 
Pabon had made a “substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right,” a jurisdictional prerequisite before a 
COA may issue.  28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).  Our jurisdiction turns 
on whether the trial court may have committed a Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause violation under Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), by allowing a non-
testifying codefendant‟s confession to be admitted into 
evidence despite its potential to prejudice Pabon‟s defense. 
We conclude that Pabon has made a substantial 
showing that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation may 
have been violated.  On the equitable tolling issue, we hold 
that the facts Pabon alleges regarding his language inability 
(if true), coupled with the prison system‟s lack of Spanish-
language legal materials or interpreters, would be 
extraordinary circumstances.  We also hold that Pabon 
exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing his claims.  Thus, 
we reverse the District Court‟s ruling that Pabon was not 
reasonably diligent, vacate its order of dismissal, and remand 
for an evidentiary hearing on the factual issue of whether 
Pabon faced the extraordinary circumstances he claims. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Crime 
The back-story begins with Elias Pagan, a drug dealer 
who in 1997 controlled the corner of Eighth and Birch Streets 
in Philadelphia.  Six men who worked for Pagan were 
involved in the crime at issue or the subsequent trial:  Carlos 
Robles (“Guatauba”), Arisbel Ortiz, George Roman, José 
DeJesus, Jonathan Hernandez, and the petitioner, Pabon.  
Aileen Centeno, Pagan‟s common-law wife, lived with him 
and knew these men.   
On March 18, 1997, Felix Vargas, a member of a rival 
drug group, shot and injured Guatauba, who vowed to kill 
Vargas.  Elias Pagan witnessed the shooting and told 
Guatauba that he would pay him if he killed Vargas.  On May 
30, 1997, Guatauba, Ortiz, Roman, Hernandez, DeJesus, 
Pabon and Centeno were present at Pagan‟s home when plans 
were made to kill Vargas later that night.  Around 10:30 p.m., 
Ortiz reported to Pagan that he had found Vargas, and Pagan 
told Ortiz to come to Pagan‟s house with his car.  At the 
house, Pagan provided the men with guns and black ski 
masks to wear during the planned shooting.
1
  Pagan 
distributed three weapons:  AK-47 rifles for Guatauba and 
DeJesus, and a handgun for Hernandez.  Pabon was not 
provided a weapon.  His confession, later taken by 
Philadelphia police, states that he already possessed a 9mm 
handgun that he used in the shooting. 
                                              
1
 Pabon is the only member of the group that was not alleged 
to have worn a mask. 
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After leaving Pagan‟s house, Ortiz drove his car to the 
intersection of Franklin and Indiana Streets, blocking the 
parked car in which Vargas was sitting.  Guatauba allegedly 
was in the front passenger seat of Ortiz‟s car, while DeJesus, 
Pabon and Hernandez were in the back seat.  Wearing their 
ski masks, Guatauba and two or three other men
2
 got out of 
Ortiz‟s car and started shooting at Vargas.  He was killed 
immediately and a bystander, Elizabeth Carrisquilla, was also 
fatally shot.  Two other female bystanders, both on Franklin 
Street, were shot but survived their injuries.  
At trial, a ballistics expert testified that there were five 
firearms involved in the attack:  two AK-47s, two 9mm semi-
automatic handguns, and one .45 caliber handgun.  
Prosecutors contended that the assailants used four of those 
guns.  The fifth gun, one of the two 9mm handguns, was used 
to shoot at the assailants by an unknown person who was 
never identified.  A shot from that fifth gun injured Ortiz, 
who drove away with some of the other shooters, purportedly 
leaving Pabon and the other remaining shooter behind to flee 
on foot. 
Back at Pagan‟s house on Birch Street, Pagan told 
Centeno to give two bundles of $2,500 each to Guatauba in 
payment for the murder.  Guatauba kept one bundle and gave 
the other to DeJesus.  A few days later, Pabon went with 
Pagan and Centeno and their kids, along with Hernandez and 
Roman, to Wildwood, New Jersey, for one week.  On 
                                              
2
 There was confusion at trial regarding how many shooters 
there were.  Witnesses saw three shooters, all wearing masks.  
However, the prosecution alleged that there were four 
shooters, one of whom was not wearing a mask (Pabon).    
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returning to Philadelphia, Pabon was shot in an unrelated 
incident.  After being released from the hospital, he stayed 
with Pagan for a few days and then went to his home town in 
Puerto Rico.   
Police arrested Pabon in Puerto Rico on charges 
related to the murders of Vargas and the bystander, 
Carrisquilla, and read him his Miranda rights in Spanish.  
After his extradition to Philadelphia, Philadelphia Police 
interrogated him in Spanish.
3
  Pabon ultimately gave a 
confession, conducted in Spanish but translated into English 
by Detective Perez, in which he admitted to dealing drugs and 
to being one of the shooters in the attack on Vargas.   
B. The Structure of Pabon’s Joint Trial 
The Philadelphia DA‟s Office, on behalf of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, prosecuted Pabon jointly 
with four codefendants for the murders of Vargas and 
Carrisquilla.  His codefendants were: (1) Pagan, alleged to 
have planned and paid for the killing but not to have been one 
of the shooters; (2) Centeno, Pagan‟s common-law wife who 
the DA claimed was involved in the conspiracy to murder 
Vargas; (3) DeJesus, an alleged shooter; and (4) Hernandez, 
an alleged shooter.  
                                              
3
  Pabon has maintained from the time of his arrest that he 
reads, writes, and understands only Spanish.  Detective Carlos 
Perez (who speaks Spanish) asked Pabon “[D]o you read, 
write and understand English?”  Pabon‟s answer was “no.”  
Detective Perez then questioned Pabon in Spanish and 
answers were recorded by Detective John McDermott in 
English.   
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Guatauba, also believed to be one of the shooters, was 
not apprehended by authorities at the time of trial.  Ortiz, the 
purported driver, accepted a plea deal to avoid the death 
penalty and testified for the Commonwealth.  Roman, a 
member of the drug group who was not involved in the 
shooting, also testified for the Commonwealth as part of a 
cooperation agreement regarding a different murder charge. 
Judge Jane Greenspan presided over the joint jury trial.  
Each of the five defendants was represented by his or her own 
defense counsel.  All of the defense attorneys moved for 
severance, but their motions were denied.  The defense 
attorneys later moved for recusal of Judge Greenspan based 
on remarks made by her during voir dire, but those motions 
also were denied.  Pabon used a court translator for pre-trial 
hearings and during the trial.     
The Commonwealth‟s decision to introduce 
confessions given by several of the non-testifying 
codefendants raised the potential for violations of the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the 
Constitution.  Thus, the trial transcript reflects negotiated, 
line-by-line edits to these confessions, made by Judge 
Greenspan in discussion with prosecutors and several of the 
defense attorneys.   
Pabon‟s court-appointed counsel in this habeas appeal 
points to one passage in DeJesus‟s statement as a Bruton 
violation.  The relevant portion of his statement reads:  
Question: José, is there anything 
you would like to add to your 
statement? Answer, Yeah. I know 
that I didn‟t shoot the girl who got 
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killed.  Another should be 
arrested for this.  He paid it off.  
He even gave me the Grand 
National for helping to do this 
besides the money that Guatauba 
paid me.   
(N.T. 8/2/99: 44) (emphasis added).  The statement referred 
to Pagan, who employed the other men and was alleged to 
have paid for the killings.  Pagan‟s attorney objected, asking 
that the statement be limited to “I know that I didn‟t shoot the 
girl who got killed” to avoid a violation of his client‟s Sixth 
Amendment rights.  The Commonwealth argued that the 
statement should not be redacted because it did not name 
Pagan explicitly.  Ultimately, his attorney and the DA agreed 
to limit the statement to “I know that I didn‟t shoot the girl 
who got killed.  Another should be arrested for this.”  Pabon‟s 
claim that this redacted statement, in the context of the trial, 
violated his Confrontation Clause rights is discussed in part 
III.B below.   
C. Evidence Admitted at Trial 
In addition to Pabon and DeJesus‟s confessions, 
several of Pabon‟s codefendants gave statements to the police 
that were introduced at trial.  Pagan‟s initial statement to the 
police implicated Guatauba, Hernandez, DeJesus and Ortiz in 
the murder, but did not implicate Pabon.  However, Roman, 
who was not a codefendant but was part of the drug group, 
testified at trial that Pabon was involved in the conspiracy to 
kill Vargas, participated in the shooting, and fled 
Philadelphia.  Ortiz, the driver, testified that he drove Pabon 
to the shooting, but he did not know if all of the men fired 
weapons when they got out of his car.  Roman and Ortiz‟s 
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testimony both conflicted with their past statements to the 
police.
4
   
Eyewitnesses at the scene saw a car fitting the 
description of Ortiz‟s car.  They saw three males get out of 
the car, one from the driver‟s side and two from the 
passenger‟s side.  All three were wearing black clothes and 
face masks.
5
  No eyewitness placed Pabon at the scene of the 
crime.  Eyewitnesses testified that on returning to Birch Street 
after the murder, three males—identified as Ortiz, Hernandez, 
and Guatauba—got out of the car.  Another witness testified 
that she saw Pagan, Centeno, Hernandez, and Guatauba 
celebrating after the shooting, but did not see Pabon.  One 
witness testified about Pabon‟s involvement in drug dealing 
but did not link him to the shooting.  
Pabon‟s confession was the Commonwealth‟s 
strongest evidence against him at trial.  In his statement to 
Philadelphia police, he admitted to dealing drugs, having a 
9mm handgun for protection, and participating in the 
                                              
4
 Like Pagan, Roman did not implicate Pabon in his initial 
statement to the police, although he did implicate Guatauba, 
DeJesus, Hernandez, and Pagan in the shooting.  Roman later 
testified against Pabon after taking a plea deal regarding a 
different homicide.  Ortiz, who also pled guilty to avoid the 
death penalty, had previously stated that Guatauba and 
DeJesus got out of the car and shot Vargas, making no 
mention of Pabon. 
5
 The prosecution‟s theory was that a fourth man (Pabon) got 
out of the car but did so after the witnesses had ducked for 
cover.  They also argued that Ortiz, the driver, never had a 
gun and thus it was likely that he did not get out of the car. 
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shooting.  It also states:  “While I was shooting at [Vargas], I 
heard [Ortiz] holler I am shot.  I look at [Ortiz].  He was 
holding his head.  The way his car was parked, I knew the 
shot that hit [Ortiz] came from Franklin Street, so I started 
firing in that direction.”  
At trial, Pabon attempted to repudiate his confession.  
He presented testimony from a forensic document examiner 
that the signature on his confession was unlikely his own.  
Pabon also argued that there was no new information 
provided in his statement that the police did not already 
know.  Additionally, he pointed out that questions commonly 
asked in such interviews, to which the police would not have 
known the answers, were not asked in Pabon‟s interrogation.6  
In rebuttal, however, the DA presented its own document 
examiner who testified that the signature on the confession 
was likely Pabon‟s.  During deliberations, the jury requested 
to see, in their words, Pabon‟s “alleged confession.”  Judge 
Greenspan informed them they could only have it read to 
them and see only the signatures.
7
   
                                              
6
 For example, the question “what was the last grade you 
completed” appeared in DeJesus‟s confession, but not 
Pabon‟s. 
7
 Pabon‟s confession and the testimony of the two co-
conspirators who became state‟s witnesses, Roman and Ortiz, 
were the primary evidence that put Pabon at the scene of the 
crime.  The DA‟s limited physical evidence consisted of 
Pabon‟s fingerprints on the outside of Ortiz‟s car.  The DA 
argued that Pabon‟s own confession explains why 
eyewitnesses did not see him after the crime: after they killed 
Vargas, it states, “[Ortiz] then took off in his car down 
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D. Pabon’s Conviction and State Court Appeals 
At trial, the jury found Pabon guilty on all counts but 
could not agree on a sentence.  Judge Greenspan imposed two 
consecutive life sentences for the murders of Vargas and 
Carisquilla, six to 20 years for conspiracy, concurrent terms 
of five to 20 years for each aggravated assault conviction, one 
to two years for possessing an instrument of crime, and one to 
two years for reckless endangerment. 
Pabon‟s appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
raised six substantive issues, including the Bruton issue into 
which we now make a threshold inquiry.  The Superior Court 
adopted an opinion written by Judge Greenspan as its own 
and affirmed Pabon‟s convictions.  Commonwealth v. Pabon, 
768 A.2d 886 (Pa. Super. 2002).  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court then denied Pabon‟s petition for allowance of appeal.   
Pabon timely filed a pro se petition pursuant to the 
Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).  Sondra Rodrigues 
was appointed counsel and filed an amended petition and 
memorandum of law.  The PCRA Court, in an opinion written 
by Judge Greenspan, dismissed the petition on the merits 
without a hearing.   
Pabon appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, 
which affirmed the PCRA Court‟s dismissal in an 
unpublished decision.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
again denied allowance of appeal.  Pabon‟s subsequent 
                                                                                                     
Indiana [Street] with two guys, then I ran.  We went to Birch 
Street.”  It also stated that he changed his clothes in an 
abandoned house down the street and did not return to the 
area.   
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petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the United 
States Supreme Court.   
E. Pabon’s Pro Se Habeas Petition in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania  
Pabon filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus with 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on 
September 20, 2007 and it was received by the Court on 
October 5, 2007.
8
  The District Court referred the matter to a 
Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation 
(“R&R”).  It concluded that Pabon‟s petition was filed ten 
months after AEDPA‟s one-year statutory deadline and was 
therefore time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244.  The R&R also 
concluded that there was no basis for equitable tolling of the 
limitations period. 
Pabon filed hand-written objections to the R&R, 
arguing that he was entitled to have the time for filing 
equitably tolled because he does not read, write or speak 
English and he was repeatedly denied access to Spanish 
language materials or a translator while in prison.  The Court 
overruled Pabon‟s objections, adopted the R&R, and 
dismissed the habeas petition as untimely.  Pabon filed a 
timely notice of appeal in our Court and, subsequently, an 
application for a COA.  
We granted the COA on “whether the habeas petition 
was timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), including the 
                                              
8
 The federal “prisoner mailbox rule” provides that a 
document is deemed filed on the date it is given to prison 
officials for mailing.  See Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 113 
(3d Cir. 1998).  
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question whether there is a basis for equitably tolling the 
limitations period.”  We later issued an order staying oral 
argument, however, pending resolution of a possible 
jurisdictional defect in the COA.  The order directed the 
parties to brief whether Pabon had made a substantial 
showing of the denial of a constitutional right as required by 
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). 
That jurisdictional issue and Pabon‟s equitable tolling 
claim are now before us.  We conclude that Pabon has made a 
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right 
based on the alleged Bruton violation.  Pabon‟s codefendant 
DeJesus‟s redacted confession, when combined with Pabon‟s 
own confession and the limited number of codefendants 
allegedly involved in the shooting, may have created a 
damaging inference that DeJesus was accusing Pabon of 
being a shooter in the crime and violated Pabon‟s Sixth 
Amendment right to confront witnesses testifying against 
him.   
Further, we hold that Pabon is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on his equitable tolling claim.  The 
District Court misinterpreted the evidence before it, stating 
that Pabon had access to a Spanish speaking attorney when in 
fact he did not.  Pabon‟s claim that he does not speak, read, or 
write in English exceeds the initial showing of extraordinary 
circumstances required by two other Courts of Appeals.  See 
Diaz v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2008), and Mendoza v. 
Carey, 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006).  He has also shown a 
significant degree of due diligence—including reaching out to 
an attorney he thought spoke Spanish (who did not) and 
requesting translation assistance multiple times despite the 
prison‟s repeated denials.  While there is not enough evidence 
in the record to determine whether Pabon‟s language 
14 
 
deficiency actually caused the delay in bringing his habeas 
claim, an evidentiary hearing is warranted. 
III.  JURISDICTION 
A.   Standard of Review  
Before a circuit court may rule on an appeal from a 
district court, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas corpus 
relief must obtain a COA as a “jurisdictional pre-requisite.”  
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (citing 28 
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)).  Slack v. McDaniel, interpreting § 
2253(c), clarifies that when a district court denies a habeas 
petition on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of 
the underlying constitutional claim, as here, a COA may issue 
only if the petitioner shows that:  (1) “jurists of reason would 
find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its 
procedural ruling;” and (2) “jurists of reason would find it 
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the 
denial of a constitutional right.”  529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). 
An appellate court‟s “COA determination under § 
2253(c) requires an overview of the claims in the habeas 
petition and a general assessment of their merits.”  Miller-El, 
537 U.S. at 336.  This is a “limit[ed],” “threshold inquiry” 
that “does not require full consideration of the factual or legal 
bases adduced in support of the claims.”  Id.9  In Miller-El, 
                                              
9
 The Commonwealth argues that we should use the AEDPA 
standard for deciding the merits of habeas claims brought by 
state prisoners in our COA determination.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d) (claims “adjudicated on the merits in State court” 
must have “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
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the Supreme Court “reiterate[d] that a prisoner seeking a 
COA need only demonstrate „a substantial showing of the 
denial of a constitutional right.‟”  Id. at 327 (citing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2253(c)(2)).  “A petitioner satisfies this standard by 
demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the 
district court‟s resolution of his constitutional claims or that 
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to 
deserve encouragement to proceed further.”  Id. (citing Slack, 
529 U.S. at 484).  While a state prisoner must show 
“„something more than the absence of frivolity‟ or the 
existence of mere „good faith‟ on his or her part,” he or she is 
not required “to prove, before the issuance of a COA, that 
some jurists would grant the petition for habeas corpus.  
Indeed, a claim can be debatable even though every jurist of 
reason might agree, after the COA has been granted and the 
case has received full consideration, that petitioner will not 
prevail.”  Id. at 338 (internal citation omitted).    
                                                                                                     
Federal law” for relief to be granted).  This attempt to raise 
our standard of review at the COA stage is precisely what the 
Supreme Court rejected in Miller-El.  It noted that the Fifth 
Circuit Court had used “too demanding a standard on more 
than one level.”  537 U.S. at 341.  “It was incorrect for the 
Court of Appeals” to import the standard from § 2254(d)(2), 
as it “applies to the granting of habeas relief rather than to the 
granting of a COA.”  Id. at 341-42.  It was also “incorrect for 
an even more fundamental reason.  Before the issuance of a 
COA, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to resolve the 
merits of petitioner‟s constitutional claims . . . .  Deciding the 
substance of an appeal in what should only be a threshold 
inquiry undermines the concept of a COA.  The question is 
the debatability of the underlying constitution claim, not the 
resolution of that debate.”  Id. at 342. 
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We determined in our initial COA that reasonable 
jurists could dispute the District Court‟s dismissal of Pabon‟s 
habeas petition as untimely filed, also noting that the Second 
and Ninth Circuit Courts have concluded that there may be a 
basis for equitably tolling AEDPA‟s limitations period due to 
severe language barriers.  See Diaz, 515 F.3d 149; Mendoza, 
449 F.3d 1065.  We now decide that the second jurisdictional 
requirement, a substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right, has been met.  
B.  Pabon’s Confrontation Clause Claim 
Pabon claims that the introduction at trial of the 
confession of DeJesus, Pabon‟s non-testifying codefendant, 
violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right 
under Bruton.  To resolve whether this claim is debatable, 
we make a threshold inquiry regarding the application of 
Bruton and its progeny to Pabon‟s trial and conviction.  
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.     
1. Bruton and Progeny 
Trials with multiple defendants create opportunities for 
violations of the Sixth Amendment right of cross-
examination.  Bruton held that, in a joint trial, a defendant‟s 
right under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
is violated by introducing a non-testifying codefendant‟s 
confession that implicates the defendant as a participant in the 
crime.  Such statements violate the Sixth Amendment even 
when the jury is explicitly instructed that the testimony at 
issue is only to be considered as evidence against the 
17 
 
codefendant.
10
  This is because jurors in joint trials cannot be 
expected to “perform the overwhelming task of considering” 
a codefendant‟s confession “in determining the guilt or 
innocence of the declarant and then of ignoring it in 
determining the guilt or innocence of any codefendants . . . .”  
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 131.
11
  In these circumstances, jury 
instructions are “intrinsically ineffective” because the 
inadmissible confession “cannot be wiped from the brains of 
the jurors.”  Id. at 129.   
The Supreme Court elaborated on Bruton‟s core 
holding in a case issued the same day, Cruz v. New York, 481 
U.S. 186, 194 (1987).  When a defendant‟s confession 
substantially “interlocks” with the non-testifying 
codefendant‟s confession, this exacerbates the potential for a 
Bruton violation rather than rectifying it.  Id. at 192.  This is 
because it is not the reliability of the codefendant‟s 
confession that is at issue in Bruton situations, but the 
likelihood that the jury is not able to disregard it.  Id. at 192-
93.  The more “interlocking” the codefendant‟s confession, 
                                              
10
 “Ordinarily, a witness whose testimony is introduced at a 
joint trial is not considered to be a witness „against‟ a 
defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony 
only against a codefendant.”  Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 
200, 206 (1987).  This is based on the “assumption . . . that 
jurors follow their instructions.”  Id.  Bruton provides a 
narrow exception to that assumption. 
11
 As Justice Stewart wrote in his oft-quoted concurrence in 
Bruton, those statements “are at once so damaging, so 
suspect, and yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be 
trusted to give such evidence the minimal weight it logically 
deserves.”  Id. at 138. 
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the less likely jurors will be capable of putting it out of their 
minds in deciding the defendant‟s guilt or innocence.  Id.  
Thus, while a “codefendant‟s confession will be relatively 
harmless if the incriminating story it tells is different from 
that which the defendant himself is alleged to have told, [it 
would be] enormously damaging if it confirms, in all essential 
respects, the defendant‟s alleged confession.”  Id. at 192.  The 
damage to the defendant might be less “devastating” “if [he] 
were standing by his confession . . . .”  Id. (emphasis in 
original).  However, “in the real world of criminal litigation, 
[when] the defendant is seeking to avoid his confession,” the 
damage is significant, like that in Bruton.  Id. (emphasis in 
original).   
Two subsequent cases addressed the thorny issue of 
redacted statements of non-testifying codefendants.  In 
Richardson v. Marsh, the Court held that when “any reference 
to [the defendant‟s] existence” has been removed and the 
confession “bec[omes incriminating] only when linked with 
evidence introduced later at trial,” limiting instructions may 
cure what would otherwise be a Bruton violation.  481 U.S. 
200, 211, 208 (1987).  While the testimony in Bruton directly 
named the defendant, in Richardson “the confession was not 
incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked 
with” the defendant‟s testimony.  Id. at 208.  The Court noted 
that “[w]here the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a 
less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the 
instruction to disregard the evidence.”  Id. 
However, the distinction between directly naming a 
codefendant and indirect linkage is not rigid.  Even redacted 
confessions that remove the defendant‟s name completely, 
using a blank space or neutral pronoun instead, may 
sometimes violate Bruton.  Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 189 
19 
 
(1998).  “Redactions that simply replace a name with an 
obvious blank space or a word such as „deleted‟ or a symbol 
or other similarly obvious indications of alteration . . . so 
closely resemble Bruton‟s unredacted statements that . . . the 
law must require the same result.”  Id. at 192.  An “obvious 
deletion” is likely to “call the jurors‟ attention specifically to 
the removed name” and may “overemphasize the importance 
of the confession‟s accusation.”  Id. at 193.  Jury instructions 
are likely to exacerbate the situation, as the instruction itself 
“will provide an obvious reason for the [redaction].”  Id.   
In limiting Richardson, Gray noted that “inference 
[connecting a codefendant‟s statement to the defendant] pure 
and simple cannot make the critical difference” between a 
Bruton violation and permissible testimony under 
Richardson.  Id. at 195.  It is the “kind of, not the simple fact 
of, inference” that might lead a jury to infer that testimony 
incriminated a codefendant in some redacted statements but 
not others.  Id. at 196 (emphases in original).  Thus, context is 
relevant to determining whether a Bruton violation has 
occurred, regardless whether the challenged testimony has 
been redacted or curative instructions given. 
For example, our Court held in Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 
F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2008), that even when neutral pronoun 
substitution or its equivalent is used (in that case, “my boy” 
or “the other guy”), if there is a strong implication that the 
non-testifying codefendant‟s confession refers to the 
defendant, it may still violate Bruton despite the substitution 
and use of jury instructions.
12
  In addition, the number of 
                                              
12
 Similarly, in United States v. Hardwick we determined that 
substituting the phrase “others in the van” was not adequately 
protective, as the phrase clearly referred to only two of the 
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codefendants that could be implicated in a Gray analysis, 
where redactions or substitutions have been used, is also 
important.  Compare United States v. Richards, 241 F.3d 335, 
341 (3d Cir. 2001) (Bruton violated where only three people 
were involved in crime) with Priester v. Vaughn, 382 F.3d 
394, 400-01 (3d Cir. 2004) (“another guy” did not implicate 
any particular person given that at least 15 persons were 
involved in the crime, and the placeholder used was “bereft of 
any innuendo [linking] them” to particular defendants, in 
contrast to Richards in which redactions “were tantamount to 
an explicit reference” to a codefendant).   
Under AEDPA‟s deferential review standard, our 
Court in Vazquez rejected the Pennsylvania Supreme Court‟s 
seeming “bright-line rule that when terms like „my boy,‟ the 
„other guy,‟ or the „other man‟ are used [as substitutions,] . . . 
there cannot be a Bruton violation.”  Vazquez, 550 F.3d at 
281.  Rather, as Vazquez instructs, using a bright line is “an 
unreasonable application „of clearly established Federal law 
under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States‟” given the necessity of determining how strongly a 
codefendant‟s statement implicates the defendant and the 
likelihood that it would be disregarded by the jury.  Id. at 282. 
                                                                                                     
multiple codefendants on trial.  544 F.3d 565, 573 (3d Cir. 
2008).  We “underscore[d] . . . that the nature of the linkage 
between the redacted statement and the other evidence in the 
record is vitally important in determining whether a 
defendant's Confrontation Clause right has been violated.”  
Id. 
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2. DeJesus‟s Confession in the Context of Pabon‟s 
Joint Trial 
Pabon‟s codefendant DeJesus confessed to the crime 
(from the conspiracy to murder Vargas through payment he 
received for the murder) in a statement recorded by Detective 
McDermott.  The relevant portion of DeJesus‟s confession 
that Detective McDermott read to the jury at trial follows:   
Question, José, when the 
shootings happened, how many 
times did you shoot?  Answer, 
like a good twelve times.  I was 
standing in front of [Vargas]‟s car 
shooting into it. 
Question, did you see a female 
standing near [Vargas]‟s car when 
you were shooting?  Answer, 
yeah.  She was on the side of the 
car.  I screamed at her, yo, get the 
fuck out of here.  She moved 
away, and that is how I know I 
didn‟t hit the girl.  I am standing 
real close to [Vargas]‟s car, so I 
know that everything I shot was at 
[Vargas].  How could I miss, I 
was so close. 
Question, do you know how the 
two females who were standing on 
Franklin Street were shot?  
Answer, no, I didn‟t even see 
them. 
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. . . 
Question, José, is there anything 
you would like to add to your 
statement?  Answer, Yeah.  I 
know that I didn’t shoot the girl 
who got killed.  Another should be 
arrested for this.  
(N.T. 8/2/99: 42-44) (emphases added). 
As noted above, DeJesus‟s statement initially 
implicated Pagan.  It stated that the person who should be 
arrested for Carisquilla‟s shooting should be the person who 
“paid it off” (i.e., provided money and weapons).  (N.T. 
8/2/99: 22-23).  However, it was truncated to stop at “another 
should be arrested for this,” with all further references to 
Pagan‟s identity and role deleted, as Pagan‟s counsel 
requested because of his own client‟s Bruton rights.  (N.T. 
8/2/99: 1-33).  The prosecution, defense counsel, and trial 
court were involved in redacting DeJesus‟s statement.  Judge 
Greenspan instructed the jury that DeJesus‟s confession could 
only be used as evidence against him, not any of his 
codefendants.  (N.T. 8/2/99: 38-39).  She repeated this 
caution at the end of trial in regard to Pabon in particular.  
Though DeJesus‟s confession did not identify Pabon 
by name, he argues that the use of “another” (in the statement 
“[a]nother should be arrested for this”) was an “unnatural 
locution” that revealed reference to a codefendant‟s 
participation in the shooting.  See Gray, 523 U.S. at 192 
(“obvious indications of alteration” may cause a Bruton 
violation even in a redacted statement).  He claims that 
DeJesus‟s confession would have implicated Pagan, had it 
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not been truncated, but was altered to implicate Pabon (or 
Hernandez or Gautauba) as read to the jury at trial.   
In context, DeJesus‟s statement that “another” should 
be arrested for Carrisquilla‟s death does seem to refer to 
“another” of the alleged shooters.13  It is in a passage of 
DeJesus‟s confession discussing how the shooting occurred, 
making the natural inference from the cropped statement that 
DeJesus was implicating another shooter.  Of the five 
codefendants, two were not alleged to have been shooters, 
Pagan and Centeno.  That leaves only Pabon, Hernandez, and 
Guatauba (with DeJesus the fourth alleged shooter) as the 
person referred to as “another.”  If the jury credited DeJesus‟s 
confession that he shot Vargas but “another” should be 
arrested for shooting Carisquilla, Pabon and Hernandez are 
the only two codefendants to whom he plausibly could have 
referred in this passage of his confession (three persons in all 
could have been referenced, but one was not a codefendant
14
).  
While this is not so clear-cut a situation that only one 
defendant is implicated by a codefendant‟s statement, it is 
also a far cry from the situation in Priester, for example, in 
which 15 codefendants were all equally implicated.  382 F.3d 
at 401.  Here, because one of three persons was implicated by 
the statement,
 
it is possible that attempting to avoid a Bruton 
violation for one codefendant may have created one for two 
                                              
13
 We note that, even were this an “unnatural locution,” 
“another” was the word DeJesus used.  It is the context, and 
the truncation of DeJesus‟s explanation, that implicates Pabon 
(or the other alleged shooters) rather than Pagan.  
14
 Guatauba was not one of the codefendants, as he had not 
been apprehended at the time of trial.  However, he was 
referenced at trial as an alleged shooter.   
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of the others.
15
  
In addition, as noted above, Pabon allegedly confessed 
to shooting toward “Franklin Street,” the street from which 
shots were fired at Ortiz.  (N.T. 7/30/99: 64).  This increases 
the likelihood that DeJesus‟s statement regarding the shooting 
of “two females who were standing on Franklin Street” was 
particularly damaging to Pabon (rather than Hernandez or 
Guatauba, the other alleged shooters).  Pabon claims that his 
challenged confession “is cumulative to the harm suffered . . . 
because of the admission of the DeJesus statement . . . .”  
Pabon Br. 22.  The potential corroboration of Pabon‟s 
confession by DeJesus‟s does raise flags under Cruz.  That is, 
the “interlocking” nature of these two confessions makes it 
less likely, not more, that curative instructions would solve 
the Bruton problem.  Reinforcing this point, Pabon also 
argues that the prosecutor‟s closing argument to the jury 
contended that Pabon and DeJesus‟s confessions corroborated 
each other.  (N.T. 8/4/99: 94).  In these ways, DeJesus‟s 
confession may have prejudiced Pabon by increasing the 
likelihood that the jury would believe he was one of the 
shooters. 
3.  Pennsylvania Superior Court‟s Analysis of Pabon‟s 
Bruton Claim 
The DA asserts that the state trial court reasonably 
concluded that Pabon‟s Bruton claim “is plainly meritless.”  
                                              
15
 This is also not a case in which the statement at issue was 
scrubbed of all reference to codefendants.  As in Gray, the 
“statement . . . obviously refer[s] directly to someone . . . .”  
523 U.S. at 196.  
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Supp. Br. for Appellees 28.  As noted, however, in Vazquez 
we rejected explicitly the bright-line approach taken by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, under which a substitution of a 
pronoun for a name is adequate provided no specific name 
was used and limiting instructions were given.  Vazquez, 550 
F.3d at 282.  That same flawed, bright-line approach was 
applied in deciding Pabon‟s direct appeal.  This implies that 
Pabon‟s Bruton claim was decided under Pennsylvania case 
law that is an “unreasonable application of Federal law.”  Id. 
In addition, Judge Greenspan repeatedly emphasized 
the “curative” instructions issued at several times during the 
trial.  These instructions, however, are beside the point.  The 
central premise of Bruton is that “[l]imiting instructions may 
not in fact erase the prejudice” created by a codefendant‟s 
confession.  Bruton, 391 U.S. at 132.  Moreover, as Cruz 
noted, under Bruton it is the “likelihood that the instruction 
will be disregarded,” not the quality of the instruction or its 
repetition, that is relevant in determining whether a Bruton 
violation has occurred.  Cruz, 481 U.S. 186.  The United 
States Supreme Court has reaffirmed that instructions can 
exacerbate the problem jurors face in trying to segregate 
evidence that is admissible as to one codefendant but not 
another.  See Gray, 523 U.S. at 193.  Thus, the Court that 
decided Pabon‟s direct appeal should have focused on the 
degree to which DeJesus‟s confession implicated Pabon and 
the extent of any resulting prejudice in the particular 
circumstances of the trial, rather than the quality or number of 
jury instructions given. 
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C. Pabon’s Bruton Claim is Debatable for the 
Purposes of a COA 
Under the Miller-El standard, Pabon‟s alleged Bruton 
violation need only be debatable.  For the reasons explained 
above, we conclude that reasonable jurists could debate 
whether Pabon has a meritorious claim regarding the 
introduction of DeJesus‟s confession at their joint trial and 
that claim deserves developing.
16
  See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 
327. 
IV. EQUITABLE TOLLING 
A. The R&R and the District Court’s Ruling 
As noted earlier, the District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge‟s R&R, which denied Pabon‟s habeas 
petition as untimely.  Under AEDPA, a prisoner has one year 
from the date a state court conviction becomes final, not 
including the time during which state post-conviction appeals 
are pending, to file an application for a writ of habeas corpus.  
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).  Judgment becomes final at “the 
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 
seeking such review.”  Id.   
Pabon‟s conviction became final on August 12, 2002, 
when the time expired for seeking certiorari for direct review 
                                              
16
 We note that Pabon‟s pro se habeas petition raised four 
claims.  Although his appointed counsel deals with only one 
of those claims (the Bruton claim) for COA purposes, that 
does not foreclose consideration of his other claims in the 
District Court were Pabon to succeed on his equitable tolling 
claim.  
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by the United States Supreme Court.  See Kapral v. United 
States, 166 F.3d 565, 567 (3d Cir. 1999).  About nine months 
later (May 12, 2003),
17
 statutory tolling of the limitations 
period began when Pabon filed his PCRA petition in the 
Court of Common Pleas.  On August 8, 2006, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania denied allowance of appeal, ending the 
statutory tolling period.
18
  As about nine months had passed 
before Pabon filed his PCRA petition, he had three months 
left before AEDPA‟s one-year filing deadline.  His habeas 
petition was filed on September 20, 2007, well past the one-
year mark. 
The R&R stated that “Pabon does not allege 
circumstances which prevent him in some extraordinary way 
from filing a timely habeas petition.”  R&R at 7.  It also 
stated that Pabon “fails to allege circumstances indicating that 
he exercised reasonable diligence.”  Id. 
Pabon filed objections (handwritten by a fellow 
inmate) to the R&R.  They were that: (1) timely filing of his 
habeas petition was unlawfully impeded by state action and 
                                              
17
 As with federal law, see supra note 8, under Pennsylvania 
law the “prisoner mailbox rule” provides that prisoner filings 
are deemed filed on the date they are delivered to authorities 
for mailing.  See Commonwealth v. Castro, 766 A.2d 1283, 
1287 (Pa. Super. 2001).  Pabon‟s petition appears to have 
been postmarked on May 12, 2003.  See Br. for Appellees 7 
n.1.  
18
 Pabon filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court 
following denial of his PCRA appeal, but statutory tolling did 
not continue while that petition was pending.  See Lawrence 
v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 329 (2007). 
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AEDPA allows a habeas petition to be submitted up to one 
year after an unlawful impediment to filing created by state 
action has been lifted, see § 2244(d)(1)(B), so, he contends, 
his petition was timely under AEDPA; and/or (2) equitable 
tolling should apply.  As to his second argument, he asserts 
that he should have been entitled to equitable tolling from 
September 7, 2006 (the date he initially requested legal 
assistance from a prison paralegal) to September 20, 2007 
(the deemed filing date of his habeas petition) due to his 
inability to read, write, or understand English, the lack of 
Spanish-language legal materials in the prison‟s restricted 
housing unit (the “RHU”), and repeated denials of requests 
for legal or translation assistance.
19
   
The District Court concluded that there was no basis 
for equitable tolling of the statutory limitations period.  In 
doing so, it did not hold an evidentiary hearing with respect to 
Pabon‟s language ability, his access to Spanish-language 
legal materials in prison, or how he may have been affected 
by his inability to obtain legal or translation assistance.  As 
noted, Pabon appealed and we granted his application for a 
COA.   
B. The Standard for Equitable Tolling 
 In determining whether equitable tolling should be 
granted, we address two questions: (1) whether the petitioner 
faced extraordinary circumstances that stood in the way of 
timely filing; and (2) whether he or she exercised reasonable 
diligence.  Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); 
see also Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2003) 
                                              
19
 Pabon also objected to the denial of his motion for counsel.   
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(same).  In Holland v. Florida the Supreme Court confirmed 
that equitable tolling may be applied to AEDPA‟s statutory 
limitations period.  130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010).
20
  
There are no bright lines in determining whether 
equitable tolling is warranted in a given case.  Rather, the 
particular circumstances of each petitioner must be taken into 
account.  Id. at 2563.  As Holland explains, while prior 
decisions provide guidance, rigid reliance on precedent 
should be avoided.  Id.  In each case, there is a need for 
“flexibility,” “avoiding „mechanical rules,‟” and “awareness . 
. . that specific circumstances, often hard to predict in 
advance, could warrant special treatment in an appropriate 
case.”  Id. (internal citation omitted).21  In sum, equitable 
tolling is appropriate when “principles of equity would make 
the rigid application of a limitation period unfair.”  Miller v. 
N.J. State Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998); 
see also LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 275 (3d Cir. 2005).  
                                              
20
 Holland confirms our Court‟s rulings that AEDPA‟s statute 
of limitations is subject to equitable tolling.  See, e.g., LaCava 
v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2005); Miller v. N.J. State 
Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 1998). 
21
 The Commonwealth urges an approach that defies the 
fundamentals of equity, asking us to conclude that a certain 
type of circumstance can never be extraordinary.  Despite 
Holland’s admonition against bright-line rules, the 
Commonwealth continues to argue that Pabon “has failed to 
state even potentially extraordinary circumstances,” 
suggesting that similar circumstances as those alleged in 
Mendoza and Diaz could not potentially be extraordinary.  
(DA‟s Rule 28(j) letter at 3).  That kind of rigid rule is 
precisely what Holland warns against.   
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However, courts need to be “sparing in their use of” the 
doctrine.  Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1999).   
C. Equitable Tolling Analysis 
1.  Extraordinary Circumstances 
Our Court has not yet addressed whether a language 
deficiency may constitute an extraordinary circumstance for 
the purposes of equitable tolling.  We find it persuasive that 
the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have both 
determined that equitable tolling might be warranted when a 
non-English speaking petitioner could not comply with 
AEDPA‟s statute of limitations because the prison did not 
provide access to AEDPA-related materials, translation, or 
legal assistance in his or her language.   
In Mendoza, the petitioner asserted that he did not 
speak English and that “the prison law library possessed no 
Spanish books, no Spanish-English legal dictionaries, and no 
postings about the AEDPA time limitations in any language.”  
449 F.3d at 1067.  The Ninth Circuit held that the 
“combination of (1) a prison law library‟s lack of Spanish-
language legal materials, and (2) a petitioner‟s inability to 
obtain translation assistance before the one-year deadline, 
could constitute extraordinary circumstances.”  Id. at 1069.  
Mendoza‟s case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing on 
his equitable tolling claim in light of that holding.  Id. at 
1071. 
Pabon has alleged almost identical extraordinary 
circumstances as the petitioner in Mendoza (indeed, Pabon‟s 
are perhaps more extraordinary given his confinement in the 
RHU).  In Mendoza, the petitioner eventually “found a newly-
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arrived, bilingual inmate willing to offer assistance” for a fee, 
and was able to file a habeas petition (though only after the 
AEDPA deadline had passed).  Id. at 1069.  Again similar to 
Mendoza, Pabon eventually received help from an English-
speaking inmate in filing his habeas petition, but after the 
AEDPA deadline.   
Second, in Diaz, the Second Circuit adopted a similar 
approach to that used in Mendoza.  515 F.3d at 154 (holding 
that “English language deficiency can warrant tolling of the 
AEDPA limitations period”).  The petitioners in Diaz—Angel 
Diaz and Yoke Yew Tan—had asserted, respectively, being 
“„primarily a Spanish speaker‟” and having “a lack of „a 
working knowledge‟ of English and „difficult[y]‟ in finding 
interpreters in the Department of Correctional Services.”  Id. 
at 151-52 (alterations in original).  The Diaz Court noted that 
“the proper inquiry is not how unusual the circumstance 
alleged to warrant tolling is among the universe of prisoners,” 
as the State had argued (and the Commonwealth urges in 
Pabon‟s appeal), “but rather how severe an obstacle it is for 
the prisoner endeavoring to comply with AEDPA‟s 
limitations period.”  Id. at 154 (emphases added).  “For the 
prisoner who cannot read English, the obstacle is undoubtedly 
serious . . . and can, in some circumstances, justify equitable 
tolling.”  Id.  In that case, however, the petitioners failed on 
the reasonable diligence prong.  Neither had made efforts “to 
learn of [AEDPA‟s] requirements within their places of 
confinement.”  Id.  
As these Circuit Courts did in Mendoza and Diaz, we 
now hold that inability to read or understand English, 
combined with denial of access to translation or legal 
assistance, can constitute extraordinary circumstances that 
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trigger equitable tolling.
22
  In addition, as the Diaz Court did, 
we note that the relevant inquiry is not whether the 
circumstance alleged to be extraordinary is unique to the 
petitioner, but how severe an obstacle it creates with respect 
to meeting AEDPA‟s one-year deadline.  
In light of this holding, we conclude that the District 
Court erred in rejecting Pabon‟s claim without an evidentiary 
hearing.  First, it erred in concluding that Pabon had not 
explained why his inability to read, speak, or write English 
caused his inability to timely file his habeas petition.  Pabon 
explained that there were no Spanish-language legal 
materials, and there was no notice of AEDPA in Spanish, in 
the RHU where he was housed for five years.  These facts, he 
                                              
22
 The Commonwealth argues that Cobas v. Burgess, 306 
F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2002), supports its position that a language 
barrier cannot constitute an extraordinary circumstance.  First, 
as explained above, Holland throws into serious doubt the 
notion that there exist types of circumstances that can never 
be extraordinary, as courts must use a case-by-case analysis 
rather than bright lines in this inquiry.  130 S.Ct. at 2563.  In 
any event, Cobas did not hold that language barriers can 
never be “extraordinary” for equitable tolling purposes—it 
merely concluded that in that case, while the petitioner had 
alleged an inability to speak or understand English, he 
appeared to have access to an interpreter, so his language 
inability had not created a language barrier.  306 F.3d at 444.  
Thus, Cobas is consistent with the approach we adopt today.  
See also Mendoza, 449 F.3d at 1069-70 (citing Cobas to 
support the holding that language inability, coupled with 
denial of translation assistance, can constitute an 
extraordinary circumstance).  
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argued, coupled with repeated denials of legal or translation 
assistance from prison officials despite efforts on his part, 
were “extraordinary circumstances” that prevented him from 
timely filing his habeas petition.  See Pabon Br. 18-19.  He 
asserted quite clearly that language inability, coupled with 
denials of assistance, created a barrier to timely filing.  
The District Court also assumed that Pabon‟s potential 
language barrier was negated by his communication with a 
“Spanish-speaking attorney.”  Op. at 2 n.1.  We disagree, as 
the evidence currently before us supports the contrary 
conclusion—that Pabon continued to face a language barrier 
until his habeas petition was filed, as he had been unable to 
obtain legal or translation assistance despite continuing 
efforts.  The record also reflects that Pabon required a 
Spanish-language translator in trial and pre-trial proceedings.  
A129-130.  A Spanish-speaking detective (Detective Perez) 
testified at trial that he read Pabon his Miranda rights in 
Spanish, questioned him in Spanish, and asked him (in 
Spanish) whether he reads, writes, or understands English, to 
which Pabon answered “no.”  (N.T. 7/30/99: 52-62).23   
In sum, there is substantial evidence in the record that 
Pabon may have faced an extraordinary circumstance:  he has 
                                              
23
 The Commonwealth argues that Pabon‟s “proficiency [in 
English] when he gave his confession and was tried, between 
1997 and 1999, are simply immaterial to his proficiency in 
November 2006, the time of the AEDPA deadline.”  Br. for 
Appellees 50 (emphasis omitted).  It may be that Pabon‟s 
language proficiency has changed while in prison, but that is 
precisely the type of factual inquiry for which an evidentiary 
hearing is required.   
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consistently claimed to be a non-English speaker, required a 
translator in his interactions with police and the court system, 
lacked access to legal materials or notice of AEDPA in 
Spanish in the RHU where he was housed for five years, and 
was repeatedly denied legal materials in Spanish or 
translation assistance.
24
  As the District Court did not hold an 
evidentiary hearing on this issue, we reverse and remand for it 
to do so.   
                                              
24
 Although the Commonwealth urges otherwise, Br. for 
Appellees 43-45, we emphasize that the assistance Pabon 
eventually received from another inmate does not bar the 
possibility that he had faced extraordinary circumstances up 
to that point.  To conclude otherwise would yield the perverse 
result of leaving prisoners at the mercy of fellow inmates.  
This presents many problems.  For example, an inmate who at 
first might be willing to provide translation or legal help 
could change his or her mind, being under no obligation to 
assist fellow inmates, or could be transferred at any time.  
Moreover, an inmate who understood enough of the 
petitioner‟s language to translate a two-paragraph grievance, 
such as the one prepared for Pabon by José Ortiz, might not 
have enough language skills (or might not be willing) to help 
a petitioner decipher federal statutes, let alone prepare an 
entire petition for habeas corpus requiring legal research and 
a considerable investment of time.  For these reasons, we 
reject the Commonwealth‟s argument that eventually 
receiving help from an inmate bars the potential for equitable 
tolling.  We also reject the Commonwealth‟s conclusory 
assertion that equitable tolling based on a language barrier is 
improper because Pabon “commit[ed] crime” in Philadelphia 
“with considerable speed and ease.”  Id. at 43.   
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2. Reasonable Diligence 
Even if a petitioner has faced extraordinary 
circumstances, he must also “exercise[] reasonable diligence 
in . . . bringing [the] claims.”  Miller, 145 F.3d at 618-619 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The Supreme Court 
addressed reasonable diligence in Holland, explaining that 
“[t]he diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is 
„reasonable diligence,‟ . . .  not „maximum feasible 
diligence.‟”  130 S.Ct. at 2565 (internal citations omitted).  
Our Court has established a similar standard.  “Due diligence 
does not require „the maximum feasible diligence;‟” “it does 
require reasonable diligence in the circumstances.”  Schlueter 
v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citations 
omitted); see also LaCava, 398 F.3d at 277.   
Here, based on the documents Pabon submitted with 
his objections to the R&R, we count ten or more efforts 
where he sought assistance, both before and after the AEDPA 
deadline.  After ascertaining that there were no Spanish-
language legal materials in the RHU, Pabon wrote to his 
PCRA attorney, in Spanish, before October 28, 2004.  He 
wrote a second letter seeking help from that attorney before 
November 30, 2004.  At various times before September 7, 
2006, he submitted “numerous written requests” seeking legal 
materials or assistance within the prison system.
25
  While in 
the RHU, he submitted a letter to the general population law 
library, with help from an English-speaking inmate, 
                                              
25
 The prison paralegal‟s denial of Pabon‟s subsequent 
request states that he had already submitted “numerous 
written requests,” A-55, and his appeal of that denial also 
notes that he had submitted prior request slips.  A-56. 
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requesting assistance from the staff paralegal, but was denied 
assistance on September 19, 2006.  On November 6, 2006, 
Pabon filed an “Official Inmate Grievance,” with the 
assistance of inmate José Ortiz, again requesting access to 
legal services and stating that he does not speak, read, or 
write in English.
26
  That grievance was denied without 
explanation.
27
  All of these efforts occurred before the 
AEDPA filing deadline of November 6, 2006.   
Pabon‟s efforts did not stop there.  Before December 
22, 2006, he again sought help from an attorney.  He 
submitted a second appeal for access to paralegal services 
before January 23, 2007.  On February 4, 2007, he requested 
the appointment of an Inmate Legal Reference Aide, but 
never received a response to his request.  Thereafter, he found 
a bilingual inmate who agreed to help him with his pro se 
habeas petition.  That petition was signed (and, as noted, 
delivered to prison officials) on September 20, 2007.   
The District Court‟s conclusion that Pabon did not 
demonstrate diligence is based, at least in part, on the 
                                              
26
 The grievance explained that “[i]t appears that the paralegal 
referred to prior request slips written by other inmates, but 
sent by me, to base her decision in not to help me [sic].” A-56 
(emphases in original).   
27
 The response to Pabon‟s Official Inmate Grievance merely 
states who made the previous decision to deny his request.  It 
does not state why it was denied or review the paralegal‟s 
decision in any manner:  “It was [the paralegal‟s] decision 
that you did not require legal assistance in accordance with 
DC ADM 007.  It is not the decision of the SCI-Mahanoy 
Library Staff.”  A-57. 
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assumption that he had a Spanish-speaking attorney.  In its 
Order dismissing Pabon‟s habeas petition, the Court stated 
that he “has made no attempt to explain why, in light of the 
fact that he contacted a Spanish speaking attorney, his 
petition was close to one year late.”  Op. at 2 n.1.  The record 
belies that statement.  The attorney the Court references 
seems to be Pabon‟s post-conviction (PCRA) attorney, who 
did not speak Spanish.  She wrote the following letter to 
Pabon on October 28, 2004:   
Dear Mr. Pabon:  
You have sent a letter to me in 
Spanish.  I do not understand it.  
If you are asking about your 
appeal, there will not be a 
decision on it until some time next 
year (or longer).  You must 
correspond with me in English in 
the future if you expect me to 
comprehend what you are saying.  
Thank you.   
Sincerely,  
Sondra R. Rodrigues, Esq.   
A-51 (emphases added).
28
     
                                              
28
 In response to further requests for assistance from Pabon, 
Ms. Rodrigues later wrote him another letter containing about 
two paragraphs of broken Spanish and one paragraph in 
English, again reiterating that she does not speak Spanish and 
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Thus, unlike the Diaz petitioners who had made no 
efforts to communicate with anyone outside of prison or learn 
of next steps to pursue their legal claims within their places of 
confinement, 515 F.3d at 154, Pabon attempted to pursue his 
claims repeatedly.  Moreover, within prison he sought access 
to legal materials in Spanish or translation assistance, but was 
denied or left without a response each time he did so.  Under 
these circumstances, we hold that Pabon was reasonably 
diligent.  
Because we hold that language inability, when coupled 
with lack of translation assistance, may constitute an 
extraordinary circumstance, and because Pabon was 
reasonably diligent in pursuing his claims, we conclude that 
the District Court erred in dismissing Pabon‟s equitable 
tolling claim without considering the evidence he offered.  
The Commonwealth should also have an opportunity to 
submit evidence in response.  Thus, we remand for an 
evidentiary hearing on the extraordinary circumstances prong 
of Pabon‟s equitable tolling claim. 
                                                                                                     
attempting to explain that her great-grandparents were from 
Portugal.  A-54.  It appears that the District Court did not 
consider this correspondence regarding Ms. Rodrigues‟s 
language abilities (or lack thereof), but instead may have 
assumed based on her last name that she would have Spanish-
language proficiency (as Pabon himself may have done).  We 
see no other basis for the conclusion that Pabon “contacted a 
Spanish-speaking attorney.”  Op at 2 n.1. 
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D. Timeliness under § 2244(d)(1)(B): “Impediment 
to Filing”  
AEDPA provides that “a one-year period of limitation 
shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a 
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).  Sub-parts to that section provide 
four possible starting dates for the tolling period.  “The 
limitation period shall run from the latest” date of those four 
options.  Id. 
Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the limitations period runs 
from “the date on which the judgment became final by the 
conclusion of direct review of the expiration of the time for 
seeking review.”29  However, Pabon argued in his application 
for a COA that § 2244(d)(1)(B) applies.  Under it, the 
limitation period runs from “the date on which the 
impediment to filing an application created by State action in 
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is 
removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such 
State action.”  § 2244(d)(1)(B).  Pabon claims that the 
Commonwealth‟s denial of Spanish-language legal assistance 
or notice of AEDPA in Spanish is an “impediment to filing” 
within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1)(B).  Our Court has not 
addressed the meaning of “impediment to filing” under § 
2244(d)(1)(B).  We do not reach the issue here because the 
impediment Pabon argues prevented him from filing 
                                              
29
 The District Court concluded that the AEDPA limitations 
period began running for Pabon on the date on which his 
judgment became final (August 12, 2003).  No party disputes 
that August 12, 2003 is the correct starting date if § 
2244(d)(1)(A) is applicable. 
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remained un-removed:  As far as we know, and as Pabon 
himself argues, at the time that he filed his habeas petition he 
was still denied Spanish-language materials, translation and 
legal assistance. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
We hold that language inability, when coupled with 
denial of legal or translation assistance, can be an 
extraordinary circumstance for equitable tolling purposes in 
the habeas context.   We also hold that Pabon was reasonably 
diligent in pursuing his claims.  Thus, Pabon‟s equitable 
tolling claim merits an evidentiary hearing.  We thus reverse 
the District Court‟s ruling, vacate its order of dismissal, and 
remand for an evidentiary hearing on the extraordinary 
circumstances Pabon has alleged in his equitable tolling 
claim. 
